Logical positivists such as Rudolf Carnap and A. J. Ayer proposed another important principle of legal positivism: namely, that sentences and the use of words must be studied in order to understand reality.  A sentence has a literal meaning only if it expresses something that is tautologous or empirically verifiable.  Moreover, the thesis of discretion is compatible with certain forms of natural law theory. According to Blackstone`s classical naturalism, conformity with natural law is a necessary condition for the legal validity of any legal system. But to the extent that natural law is incomplete, there will inevitably be questions which will have several results compatible with natural law. Since none of the relevant findings in such cases violate natural law, there is no indication that moral limits are assumed to be necessary to the content of the law itself, which precludes Blackstone from supporting the discretionary thesis in such cases. If Blackstone believes that natural law contains a principle that deprives judges of discretion, then that obligation is, of course, incompatible with discretionary theory. But the assertion that there are necessary limitations on the content of the law, in itself, is consistent with the discretionary thesis, even if it is interpreted as a conceptual claim, as long as there are cases that are indifferent to natural law. The first half of the essay provides an overview of Hart`s theory, Dworkin`s critique of that theory, and responds to these criticisms and developments of positivism, particularly in Raz`s work. This makes sense compared to Shapiro 2007. Reprinted in Leiter`s Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
Every human society has some form of social order, a way to mark and promote approved behavior, to deter disapproved behavior, and to resolve disputes about that behavior. So what distinguishes companies with legal systems and within these companies by their law? Before examining some positivist answers, it should be emphasized that these are not the only questions worth asking about the law. While understanding the nature of law requires a representation of what makes law distinctive, it is also necessary to understand what it has in common with other forms of social control. Some Marxists are positivist about the nature of law, but insist that its distinguishing features are less important than its role in reproducing and facilitating other forms of government. (Although other Marxists disagree: see Pashukanis 1924). They believe that the specificity of the law does little to shed light on their main concerns. But you can hardly know in advance; It depends on the nature of the law. Fuller`s jurisprudential legacy, however, should not be underestimated. While positivists have long recognized that the essential purpose of law is to guide behavior by rules (for example, John Austin writes that “a law. can be defined as an established rule for guiding an intelligent being by an intelligent being who has power over him” Austin 1977, p.
5), they have not always recognized the implications of this goal. Fuller`s lasting contribution to legal theory has been to flesh out these implications in the form of his principles of legality. It`s. possible for the legal system by obliging legislative bodies to respect or apply certain moral norms or political principles or expert opinions in order to transform these norms, principles or opinions into legal norms and thus into sources of law. (Kelsen 1945 [1961: 132]) Kelsen`s most important contribution lies in his attack on reductivism and his doctrine of the “fundamental norm.” It states that the law is a normative field and must be understood as such. Power does not do good – not even law – so the philosophy of law must explain the fact that the law imposes obligations on its subjects. Moreover, law is a normative system: “Law is not, as is sometimes said, a rule. It is a set of rules with the kind of unity we mean by a system” (1945 [1961:3]). For imperiatists, the unity of a legal system is that all its laws are commanded by a sovereign.